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ABSTRACT
All criminal investigations, and resulting trials,
rely upon inferential reasoning. Theories, hypo-
theses and conclusions, are drawn from the evid-
ence. The victim’s blood was on the knife; we
infer it was the murder weapon. The suspect’s
fingerprints are on the knife; we infer he killed
the victim. Sherlock Holmes, although a fictional
character, remains renowned as a great detective.
However, his methodology, which was abduction
rather than deduction, and which is innocently
used by many real detectives, is rarely described,
discussed or researched. This paper compares and
contrasts the three forms of inferential reasoning
and makes a case for articulating and developing
the role of abduction in the work, and training, of
police officers.
INTRODUCTION
Sherlock Holmes is renowned as a great
detective; indeed the paradigm (Risinger,
2006). His particular skills are said to have
been in deduction. But that is false — and
not just because he was the fictional crea-
tion of Sir Arthur Conan Doyle (Conan
Doyle, 1982). Holmes’ distinctive investig-
ative skills involved abduction (Anderson,
Schum, & Twining, 2005, p. 58). This paper
will explain abductive inferential reasoning,
contrasting it with deduction and induc-
tion. It will highlight its importance for
what is coming to be known as ‘the invest-
igative mindset’ (National Centre for Poli-
cing Excellence [NCPE], 2005). (That
document was approved by the Association
of Chief Police Officers (ACPO).)  It will
be argued that a richer understanding of
abduction could enhance the quality of
investigations by helping investigators to
generate more and better hypotheses, make
them more sensitive to potential errors in
perception, comprehension and construc-
tion, and inhibit premature decision-
making, which has been associated with a
number of improper convictions (Maguire,
2003; Maguire & Norris, 1992).
Whilst links have been made with the
ideas of Aristotle — because he distin-
guished between the form and the content
of an argument (Schum, 1994, p. 23) — the
development of abduction is usually asso-
ciated with American philosopher and
polymath, Charles Sanders Peirce
(1839–1914). Although they were contem-
poraries, there is no suggestion that Conan
Doyle (1859–1930) took his methods from,
or even knew of, Peirce (Anderson et al.,
2005). Rather Conan Doyle based Holmes’
methodology on that of one of his lecturers,
Dr Joseph Bell (1837-1911), Professor of
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Surgery in the Faculty of Medicine at the
University of Edinburgh. Bell was
renowned (Liebow, 1982) for his ability to
infer extensive and particularistic informa-
tion about his patients, before taking a
medical history.
Conan Doyle also used the methodology
himself. Amongst some 28 cases with which
he was involved (Costello, 1991), Conan
Doyle campaigned to get a pardon and
compensation for George Edalji, a solicitor
who was imprisoned for mutilating horses
(Risinger, 2006; Weaver, 2006). Risinger
argues that the Edalji case was one of three
which led to the creation of the (as then
titled) Court of Criminal Appeal, by the
Criminal Appeal Act 1907. Julian Barnes’
critically acclaimed ‘novel’ Arthur & George
(2005) (shortlisted for the Man Booker
prize) uses that case to provide ‘biographies’
of both Edalji and Conan Doyle. Whilst
criticised for factual errors (Risinger), par-
ticularly in comparison with an alternative
analysis (Weaver), Barnes highlights the
issues. How, for example, did Conan Doyle
know, better than the prosecutors and jury,
that Edalji was actually innocent?
INFERENTIAL REASONING
It is impossible to undertake any (criminal)
investigation, let alone prove allegations in
court, without adopting inferential reason-
ing. We infer further knowledge from that
which we already possess (or believe we
possess). Blood has poured from a wound
on the corpse. There is a bloody knife lying
nearby. We infer that the knife was used to
make the wound. The interviewee’s manner
changes when a particular topic is raised.
We infer that he or she is anxious about
discussing that topic. Joe Bloggins has a
criminal record for committing burglaries
where access to the premises was gained via
a toilet window. Access was gained via a
toilet window in this case. Therefore Joe
Bloggins is a suspect. Indeed this inference,
that people convicted of committing a
crime in a distinctive manner would com-
mit further crimes in that particular way,
was allowed to be an exception (the similar
facts rule) to the principle that a defendant’s
prior convictions were inadmissible in evid-
ence (Roberts & Zuckerman, 2004). (The
rule has been subsumed in changes made,
for England and Wales, by the Criminal
Justice Act 2003.)
There are three, broad forms of infer-
ential reasoning; deduction, induction and
abduction. A historical ‘development’ can
be identified. Deduction was the paradigm
in medieval trials. Rules, which were
assumed to be correct (eg trial by ordeal or
the number, rather than quality, of witnesses
(Schum, 1994)), were applied. Induction
became the current paradigm as science
superseded superstition (Jackson, 1988;
Schum). But, even though it is now widely
accepted that science is dependent upon
interpretation (eg re atomic physics, see
Bizony, 2007), which is the basis for abduc-
tion, we have yet to acknowledge that
within our trial systems. Damaska, the lead-
ing scholar of comparative legal systems, has
predicted:
As science continues to change the social
world, great transformations of factual
inquiry lie ahead for all justice systems.
These transformations could turn out to
be as momentous as those that occurred
in the twilight of the Middle Ages, when
magical forms of proof retreated before
the prototypes of our present evidentiary
technology. (Damaska, 1997, p. 151.)
Deduction
Deduction is distinctive in that, if the prem-
ises are true and the correct processes are
adopted, we can be certain that the conclu-
sions are correct. That is because deduction
involves no more than discovering the
implications of what we already know. The
syllogism is the paradigm form of deductive
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reasoning. All collies are dogs; Rover is a
collie, therefore Rover is a dog. We learn
the implications of Rover being a collie.
Fingerprints are unique; therefore this sus-
pect, whose fingerprint is on the murder
weapon, must have handled it. This sort of
reasoning is very seductive. The explicit or
implicit use of general, categorical, defini-
tional or similar all-encompassing expres-
sions (eg ‘all collies’ or even just
‘fingerprints’, as it implies all of them),
followed by ‘therefore’, or a comparable
expression, gives an impression of the con-
clusion being logical, inevitable, necessary.
It is what we want in our criminal trials; all
people who do X are guilty; the defendant
did X, therefore the defendant is guilty.
Thus it is understandable that Sherlock
Holmes’ intellect and prowess, when asso-
ciated with this deductive method, should
be celebrated. But his method was not
deductive.
Deductive reasoning, when properly
used (Kelley, 1994), tells us no more than
what is already known.
[A] deductive conclusion contains noth-
ing that is not already included in the
premises. (Anderson et al., 2005, p. 56).
Provided that the general rule, definition,
category, etc, is correct, and the correct
rules of reasoning (‘syntax’, Robertson,
1999) are used, the conclusion follows. But
those are major provisos! Deductive reason-
ing can only be of limited value to investig-
ators. Critically, there are few major
premises, the ‘all statements’, upon which
investigators can rely. Even fingerprints may
not be unique (Freckelton & Selby, 2005;
Stoney, 2002).
And the correct rules of reasoning may
not be followed. It would, for example, be
wrong to confuse major and minor prem-
ises to reason that as all collies are dogs, and
Rover is a dog, so Rover must be a collie.
The great attraction of deductive reason-
ing (which contrasts with inductive and
abductive) is the potential for conclusions
which are necessarily correct. So it is hardly
surprising that we often slip into forms of
reasoning and argument that have the
appearance of deductive reasoning. Gen-
eralisations get treated as rules or premises.
So it may be declared that: ‘People who do
not look you in the eye are dishonest. The
suspect did not look me in the eye. There-
fore he is dishonest.’ Such generalisations
are, as Schum (1994) has put it, the ‘glue’
which holds arguments about facts and
evidence together. But they are particularly
dangerous in legal contexts (Twining, 1999;
Anderson et al., 2005). So, contrary to the
impression generated by Sherlock Holmes
novels, investigators may need to know
more about the misuse, than use, of deduct-
ive reasoning in investigations.
Induction
If deduction is most closely associated with
logic and philosophy, induction is associated
with the physical sciences, particularly in
their aspirations to methodological rigour.
Deduction, since it involves drawing out
the implications of what we already know,
does not generate new knowledge. Induc-
tion, however, does create more knowledge
— but not necessarily correct conclusions.
Today we use the term induction to refer
to reasoning that provides only some but
not complete grounds for a conclusion.
(Schum, 1994, p. 24)
We observe a number of instances, for
example the frequency with which people
who have been reported as missing return
home within 72 hours; that violence and
alcohol often co-occur; that several women
do not leave their abusive partners. We
make links; we infer, we draw conclusions
and start generalising. Some of these obser-
vations, conclusions and generalisations are
very powerful, in the sense that the fre-
quency of their occurrence is high. Scient-
ific methodology focuses on assuring the
Carson
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reliability of those observations. We then
use, explicitly and implicitly, those observa-
tions to make causal connections, both to
predict and to explain. But, since they are
inductive rather than deductive, they are
not necessarily correct; reliability is not the
same as certainty. Their accuracy and reli-
ability depend upon the quality of the
methodology adopted.
Inductive reasoning is very easy to do —
we all do it without any training — but it is
difficult to do well. It is open to many
sources of error. Prejudices and biases regu-
larly arise from inappropriate inferences
from inductive knowledge. If we only
notice, or attend to, risk decisions where
harm results, then we will have incomplete
knowledge leading to poor decisions, or
inferences, in the future (Carson & Bain,
2008). The ‘availability heuristic’ refers to
the common error whereby decision-
makers, including investigators (Ask &
Granhag, 2005), rely on existing informa-
tion rather than seek further evidence or
qualify their decisions. To a considerable
extent, but not always sufficiently or appro-
priately, we assess the reliability of our
inferences by the degree of scientific rigour
involved. Thus ‘forensic science’ evidence,
particularly that relating to DNA, is highly
regarded, although errors have been made
in drawing inferences from the data (Bald-
ing & Donnelly, 1994).
Inductive reasoning, with its links to
empiricism and scientific method, tends to
be positivist. It accepts (or does not chal-
lenge the assumption) that facts exist inde-
pendent of observation; that observers can
see, hear or otherwise sense data without
affecting them. ‘The observed man was
shaven, alone, large and threatening.’ Some
expressions are too broad; we need to have
a range of words to encompass matters of
degree, such as ‘large’. But that is a language
problem; provided the witness is competent
and truthful, the facts exist, and the only
problem is finding the best verbal descrip-
tion. Abduction disagrees.
Abduction
Abduction involves interpretative epistemo-
logies which insist that ‘facts’ cannot be
understood independent of how we observe
and understand them. Abduction emphas-
ises that, when we perceive something, we
interpret it. It is not just a problem in
finding the right word. Even without realis-
ing it, we ‘make sense’ of what we have
observed or experienced. We find a dead
dog on a road and, nearby, skid marks
ostensibly from a car. We infer that the dog
ran out into the road, the car driver tried to
avoid it but, skidded, hit and killed it. We
may be right. We may have consciously
thought the inference through, or just
‘jumped’ to that conclusion. Further
knowledge, for example finding a car with
damage consistent with hitting such a dog
and hairs matching the particular dog’s
attached to it, would make our interpreta-
tion, our abduction, more credible or
powerful. Learning that the skid marks are a
week old would undermine it.
Burks (1946) argues that Peirce saw the
three systems of inferential reasoning as
stages in an enquiry. All are related to
hypotheses, as are criminal investigations.
Abduction creates the hypothesis, for
example that this particular knife was used
to kill that victim. Induction tests that
theory; forensic tests may allow a qualified
person to confirm that hypothesis. And
deduction allows us to work out the neces-
sary consequences of those inferences, if the
premises produced are true.
Abduction is the process of forming an
explanatory hypothesis. It is the only
logical operation which introduces any
new idea; for induction does nothing but
determine a value, and deduction merely
evolves the necessary consequences of a
The abduction of Sherlock Holmes
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pure hypothesis. (Peirce, quoted in
Burks, p. 303)
Peirce also associated abduction with those
sudden insights (hypotheses) when we,
unexpectedly, get an idea which solves, or
appears to solve, a problem we had not
previously managed to solve (Burks;
Schum, 1994). The abductive inference
covers, or explains, at least some of the
information we currently have.
Sherlock Holmes was skilled at
abduction.
. . . I see Holmes as the first modern
superhero, and the first great literary
superhero since King Arthur or Robin
Hood, but with a difference. Holmes was
a superhero of the mind. (Risinger,
2006, p. 5)
He was particularly skilled because his
insights were invariably shown to be correct
(as Conan Doyle ensured). In A Study in
Scarlet (Conan Doyle, 1982) Holmes attrib-
uted his competence to a rare ability ‘to
reason backwards’, to explain what had
happened, rather than forwards (‘synthet-
ically’), to predict what would happen, the
practice of ‘normal’ people. Julian Barnes
(2005) suggests that Conan Doyle con-
cluded that George Edalji was innocent
because the latter had an obvious eye
defect.
A man’s virtues are turned into faults.
Self-control presents itself as secretive-
ness, intelligence as cunning. And so a
respectable lawyer, bat-blind and of slight
physique, becomes a degenerate who flits
across fields at dead of night, evading the
watch of twenty special constables, in
order to wade through the blood of
mutilated animals. It is so utterly topsy-
turvy that it seems logical. And in Arthur’s
judgment, it all boiled down to that
singular optical defect which he had
immediately observed in the foyer of the
Grand Hotel, Charing Cross. Therein lay
the moral certainty of George Edalji’s
innocence, and the reason why he should
have become a scapegoat. (Barnes, 2005,
p. 234) (emphasis added)
Given the emphasis upon the interpretation
of the signs available — which is the science
of semiotics — it is unfortunate (in one
sense) that the book was not written by the
novelist and semiologist, Umberto Eco.
Barnes suggests that Conan Doyle was
able to produce, by abduction, a more com-
plete and accurate interpretation of the
existing facts. Significantly, he focused on
less evidence, the eye defect, interpreting it
as being so powerful as to make the other
evidence, collected by the police, irrelevant.
In the extract quoted, Barnes suggests this
required/enabled him to reverse the infer-
ences that the police had drawn. George
Edalji’s eyesight problems, his social isola-
tion, his apparently strange behaviour, and
very likely his colour and ethnic origin,
suggested criminality to the police. These
may be considered incorrect generalisations,
bias or prejudice. Conan Doyle had the
intellectual courage to reverse the infer-
ences which had led the police to Edalji.
But Conan Doyle’s ‘abduction’ may better
be understood as a perceptual judgement
(Schum, 1994), particularly as his medical
speciality had been ophthalmology. He was
able to draw upon his specialist knowledge,
that people with George Edalji’s eyesight
problems could not do the kinds of things
alleged, particularly in the dark. But that is
an induction; it involves inferring from
existing knowledge. It was not a creative
interpretation of the facts.
A more dramatic example, of the dangers
of misuses of inferential reasoning, occurred
during Edalji’s trial. The animal mutilations
had continued, even whilst Edalji was
imprisoned awaiting trial. Edalji appears to
have hoped that the ‘obvious’ inference
Carson
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would be drawn; the police had the wrong
person. But the prosecutor used his skills in
advocacy to turn that inference on ‘its
head’. He suggested that Edalji was a mem-
ber of a gang (although there was no evid-
ence of this), which mutilated animals. That
Edalji had declined bail demonstrated that
he knew the mutilations would continue so
that he could — falsely — claim that he was
innocent! (Another novel might be sug-
gested, Joseph Heller’s Catch-22.)
IMPLICATIONS OF ABDUCTION
Nordby (2000) has exemplified the central-
ity of abduction to the work of forensic
scientists, and Innes (2003) to that of
detectives. Innes observed English detect-
ives working on five active murder
inquiries, and analysed 20 completed mur-
der inquiries along with 50 other investiga-
tions. He concluded that abduction was
‘[b]y far the most commonly deployed form
of investigative logic employed on murder
enquiries . . .’ (Innes, p. 184).
It is a creative form of sense-making
interpretative inference, wherein the
presence of a fact is used to generate an
explanation for its causes. . . . In a sense,
then, crime investigation practice is
founded upon the abductive interpreta-
tion of various signifiers and can thus be
constructed as a situated and stylized
form of applied semiotic analysis. (Innes,
p. 179)
However, he notes that:
The particular difficulty of abductive rea-
soning in detective work is the slight
tendency for consequent factors to be
interpreted in such a way that their
inferred antecedents are assimilated by
the current dominant hypothesis held
by the police about the crime. (Innes,
p. 185)
But that would not be abduction. Those
detectives would be trying to fit the fresh
information into the current theory of how
and why the crime was committed. They
would be testing that hypothesis, rather
than generating a fresh one. Unless the
exercise involves a reinterpretation of all or
part of what is known, it would not include
the critical creative character of abduction.
To reduce the possibility of ‘case con-
struction’ (Maguire, 2003; Maguire &
Norris, 1992) or ‘premature decision-
making’ (Carson, 2007), detectives should
be encouraged to develop competing
abductive explanations for comparative
assessment. Innes (2003) notes that ‘forensic
science’ evidence is regularly considered to
be ‘hard evidence’ and often accorded a
status of being all but beyond criticism or
doubt. However, forensic traces are
obtained outside controlled laboratories. As
such, they are at risk of being altered,
affected or interfered with, even though the
maintenance of a secure scene of crime is
given the highest priority in policing
manuals (NCPE, 2005). Further, the police
regularly provide forensic scientists with
background information which, unsurpris-
ingly, influences their interpretations of
what must/may have happened. Conse-
quently, forensic scientists are liable to rea-
son, inductively, on hypotheses that have
been suggested to them rather than develop
their own abductive inferences. That could
put them in breach of their duties as expert
witnesses (R v Bowman [2006] EWCA
Crim 417).
The NCPE’s practical guidance on the
core investigative doctrine (which does not
mention ‘abduction’), recognises that flawed
decision-making has caused several failed
investigations and miscarriages of justice. It
notes that:
Relatively little research has been con-
ducted into ways in which investigators
make decisions. (p. 58)
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(See also Innes, 2007; Tong & Bowling,
2006.) It encourages the use of an ‘investig-
ative mindset’.
There is no process map that will assist
the investigator to develop the mindset,
it is a state of mind or attitude which
investigators adopt and which can be
developed over time through continued
use. It involves applying a set of prin-
ciples to the investigative process. This
will enable investigators to develop a
disciplined approach which assures that
the decisions they make are appropriate
to the case, are reasonable and can be
explained to others. (NCPE, p. 60)
It breaks the mindset down into five prin-
ciples, which have more to do with good
ways of acting (eg appreciating the proven-
ance of evidence, getting the most possible
from the first examination of the crime
scene, etc), rather than any attitude or state
of mind. Investigators are encouraged to use
the ABC approach: assume nothing, believe
nothing, challenge everything (p. 62). That
might assist in encouraging a critical atti-
tude towards information provided. It
should encourage a focus on the proven-
ance of facts which might encourage think-
ing about the inferences that are drawn
from them. But it is unrealistic, and illo-
gical, in that assumptions and beliefs have
to develop if any hypothesis or theory is to
develop.
A richer understanding of abduction, as a
dialectical device for generating critical and
creative hypotheses which focus attention
on the nature and quality of the inferential
reasoning being used, might help to flesh
out the concept of an investigative mindset.
The NCPE (2005) is right to insist that
‘[i]nvestigators should . . . continually chal-
lenge the meaning and the reliability of any
material they gather’ (p. 62), but individuals
may be reluctant to do so, and hierarchical
working relations may dissuade them. A
Swedish study revealed that experienced
police investigators were less sensitive than
university students to alternative hypotheses
for how and why a crime was committed
(Ask & Granhag, 2005). One potentially
very rewarding way forward would be to
incorporate the practical work of some of
the New Evidence Scholars (eg rewriting
NCPE’s (2005) practical advice in the light
of the rich set of ideas in Chapters 2 and 3
of Anderson, Schum and Twining (2005)).
Lawyers may not have a long history of
identifying and analysing facts, but they do
with regard to issues of inference and prob-
lems of proof (Anderson et al., 2005;
Schum, 1994). Those skills could be honed.
Further, the meaning of ‘facts’ is not given;
the science of semiotics has developed to
investigate the processes whereby signs are
interpreted. This has manifest relevance to
police investigations (Innes, 2003; Schum,
1994). The imagination needed for con-
templating alternative scenarios is not a
given. Do the employment conditions of
detectives and other investigators reward or
discourage abduction? It is natural (and
often appropriate) to be irritated by people
who insist on offering alternative ideas,
thereby slowing down and making
decision-making processes more fraught
and resource intensive.
CONCLUSION
Abduction is little understood and almost
never mentioned in the policing and invest-
igations literature. It is not mentioned
(other than as a type of crime) in Smith and
Flanagan’s (2000) review of the skills
required by effective detectives. To the
extent that their methodology involved
asking current officers to identify the skills
of an effective detective, this is not surpris-
ing, nor a criticism. Abduction is not a
commonplace term for investigators to use,
Carson
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or to reflect upon, even if it is common-
place to their repertoire of methods (Innes,
2003). However, it relates to several of the
headings recognised under ‘investigative
ability’.
Five skill areas were classified under the
heading of investigative ability: investig-
ative competence; appraisal of incoming
information; adaptation; strategic aware-
ness; and, innovative investigative style.
(Smith and Flanagan, p. 26)
It also relates to detectives’ valuation of
‘slow time’, that is time to reflect (Smith &
Flanagan, p. 30). Investigators should be
encouraged to be more aware of their
thinking styles, and reflective of the ways in
which they hypothesise about how offences
took place.
Three developments are essential. First,
respect for ‘healthy scepticism’ (Grieve,
Crego, & Griffiths, 2007) needs to be guar-
anteed within organisations. Abduction is
only ‘safe’ and possible where investigators
know that they are permitted and encour-
aged to think differently, although that will
often be interpreted as being ‘awkward’.
The current emphasis in the management
of police investigations is on performance,
on products rather than processes (Neyroud
& Disley, 2007). The current emphasis in
identifying and teaching investigative skills
is on the behavioural and inter-personal
skills rather than the cognitive (Grieve et
al., 2007; NCPE, 2005; Smith & Flanagan,
2000). These emphases need to be
corrected.
Attention also needs to be paid to the
grave risk of ‘intelligence’ being bureau-
cratised. Attention should be focused on
how ideas are generated, not just how they
are generalised down the line to those who
appear not to be trusted to do too much
thinking for themselves, or not having any
discretion to act differently. This is not an
attack on police forces, who have demon-
strated considerable willingness to change
(Neyroud & Disley, 2007), as it also happens
in many other institutions including uni-
versities, which are supposed to be havens
of critical, challenging and alternative
thinking. (See Power (2004) on how creat-
ivity and excitement can get reanalysed into
a risk that needs to be managed.) Savage
and Milne (2007) wonder whether there is
a danger in linking detective work with
‘creativity’ in that it will reinforce an image
of the job being about ‘art’ or craft (p. 625).
They suggest a quasi-scientific model.
However, Tong and Bowling (2006) identi-
fied ‘art,’ alongside ‘craft’ and ‘science’ in
their model of police investigators’ skills. If
the ‘art’ is understood as requiring knowl-
edge of, and skills in, epistemology and
reasoning, then, it is submitted, detectives
should be proud of and motivated by their
creative duties.
Second, the nature of abduction needs to
be developed; it needs extensive elabora-
tion, explanation, exemplification and
research. That would be entirely consistent
with, and supportive of, the steps being
taken to professionalise investigative practice
(Stelfox, 2007). It could be incorporated
into the ‘investigative mindset’ (NCPE,
2005). But it should also feature promin-
ently in basic training, with a view to
encouraging ‘good thief takers’. Some
officers are, for example, skilful in identify-
ing suspicious people or circumstances,
without understanding their methods. (A
future paper will identify possible contents
of courses designed to encourage abductive
reasoning.) Third, abduction needs to be
seen in the context of inferential reasoning
about proof as well as investigation. It is not
suggested that abductive reasoning is, let
alone that adversarial trials are, superior to
inductive reasoning or investigatory trials.
Nor is it suggested that one could or should
replace the other. Their differences and
comparative strengths should be recognised
The abduction of Sherlock Holmes
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and regarded as complementary. It is per-
fectly natural that the many sciences and
disciplines involved (eg computer sciences
(artificial intelligence applications),
decision-making sciences, forensic sciences,
law (eg New Evidence Scholarship), philo-
sophy, policing, psychology, etc) will con-
tinue to develop in their separate journals,
books, conferences and forms of ‘silos’, but
time and space needs to set aside for a multi-
disciplinary ‘science of investigations’.
After all, as Sherlock Holmes said to Dr
Watson, in A Study in Scarlet:
They say that genius is an infinite capa-
city for taking pains, . . . It’s a very bad
definition, but it does apply to detective
work. (Conan Doyle, 1982, p. 31)
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